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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

* * * * *
RIO GRANDE MOTORWAY, INC.
Appellant,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, MILLY O. BERNARD, OLOF
E. ZUNDEL, and KENNETH RIGTRUP,
Commissioners of The Public
Service Commission of Utah,
and UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS,

CASE NO. 15156

Respondents.

* * * * *
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petition of Respondent, Uintah Freightways (hereinafter referred to as Uintah) to provide direct motor carrier
service from Salt Lake City to Price, Utah, on the theory of
an alternate route deviation.
DISPOSITION BY THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSICN
Following the filing of the petition of Uintah
Freightways, The Public Service Commission convened a hearing
in Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 22, 1976.

Testimony and

other evidence of all interested parties was received at that
time.

Following the submission of briefs by the parties, a

decision was handed down by the Commission on February 4, 1977,
-1-
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granting the proposed route deviation.

The Appellant re-

quested reconsideration and f'l
i e d a dd't'
i iona 1 briefs with
Commission.

ti

Reconsideration was denied b Y th e c ornrnission,

Appellant's petition for certiorari.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
ON APPEAL
Respondents seek dismissal of the petition for

1

of certiorari and urge this Court to uphold the Commission
findings and order.

The Appellant asks that this coutth

stitute its own findings for those of the Commission ands
to have the Commission's order vacated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner Respondent currently holds a Certific

of Convenience and Necessity No. 1288 from The Public Serv
Commission of the State of Utah.

That Certificate authori

it to operate, as pertinent here, as a common carrier, tra
porting general commodities,
(A) between Salt Lake City, Utah, and all
points within the Uintah Basin, over U. s.
Highway 91, from Salt Lake City to Provo,
thence over u. S. Highway 189 to Heber City,
and thence over u. S. Highway 40 and various
Utah State and County highways to all points
within the Uintah Basin, with permission to
use the Orem cut-off, designated as Highway
u-52, as an alternate route, serving to, from
and between all Uintah Basin points; and
(B) between Vernal, Utah and Price, Utah, via
Duchesne County, Utah, serving Vernal, Utah and
Price, Utah, and all intermediate points.
(T-9.)

The above-noted. authority was issued to Uintah
1958.

Uintah operated from 1958 to May of 1976, from sal

an
·
Lake City to P rice, on

1' rregular,

on-call type service

-2-
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(R-10.)

During that period, Uintah developed some traffic

movements over its authority from Salt Lake City to Price.
(R-10.)

In May of 1976, Uintah found that it was having

difficulty with freight interlines and concurrent rates and
routings with Appellant protestant, Rio Grande Motor ways.
(R-11.)

In an effort to provide responsive service to the

public, it upgraded its existing service from irregular service
to regular route, daily service.

(R-11.)

That service operated

from Salt Lake City via U. S. 89-91, or Interstate 15, to
Provo, and then up Provo Canyon to Heber, and then to
Duchesne, Utah.

At Duchesne, Utah, it would "tack" with (B)

of Certificate 1288 and provide service south from Duchesne,
Utah, to Castle Gate, Helper and Price.

(R-7.)

The instant petition for route deviation seeks to
operate between Salt Lake'city, Utah, and Price, Utah, by
deviating at Provo, Utah to

u. s.

Highway 50-6, to Junction

of U. S. Highway 50-6, and Utah Highway 33, serving no intermediate points.

The deviation would save 140 miles, 8,424

gallons of fuel, and would eliminate the necessity of having
to traverse the sometimes dangerous Indian Canyon.

(R-9, 10.)

Petitioner petitioned The Public Service Commission
for the above-noted route deviation and hearing was held on
September 22, 1976.

At the conclusion of that hearing,

petitioners and protestants filed briefs in support of their
respective positions.

By Report and Order issued February 4,

1977, the Commission found that it was in the public interest
that the Petition for Deviation be granted and the Commission
entered an Order to that effect.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology -3Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
I

THE GRANTS OF AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY NO. 1288 ARE NOT
PARTS OF A SINGLE GRANT OF AUTHORITY AND MAY BE
TACKED.
A diligent search of the rules of The Publi'c Servi:.
Commission of the State of Utah and the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah disclosed that there are
no regulations or decision which govern the tacking of
authority.

In such an instance, the rules and case law oft

Interstate Commerce Commission may provide some guidance.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has long held
that regular route authority, i.e., authority which allows
transportation over a specifically described route, may be
joined together to provide a through service where in fact
those routes intersect.

There are no rules or decisions wh1c

have found that the tacking of two regular route pieces of
authority, although found in the same grant, may not be
"tacked".
The major source of concern to the Interstate Co!Il1
commission is the tacking of two sets of irregular route

o~:

ting authority granted to a carrier in a single proceeding.
The Commission set down the criteria it would use for allow·
ing the tacking of two sets of irregular route operating
authorities granted to a carrier in a single proceeding in
.
N w Yo_rk, 61
the case of Miller, Extension -- Poug hk eepsie,
e
_
M.C.C. 631, 637.
"However the mere fact that here both grants ~f
authority were authorized in the same proceedini
does not establish per se that they are ~a~tsdo
a single grant and, as such, may not be J01ne ·
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Although i~ is difficult to lay down a definite
rule.by which ~wo parts of a single grant may be
readily recognized, the underlying reason for
describing a single grant in separate parts
arises for the most part, in those instances where
the base area for outbound radial authority is
smaller than, and included within a larger base
area f~r t~e corresponding inbound authority,
necessitating, of course, a separate description
of each.
Where this occurs, the result is a
pattern of radial territorial authority which would
ordinarily be authorized as a between rather than a
from and to operation, except for the variation in
territorial scope or radial base."
It is our contention that the grant of authority contained
in Uintah's Certificate No. 1288 is not a grant of radial
authority, but is in actual fact a grant of non-radial
authority and, therefore, is a description of two separate
grants of authority.
The Interstate Commerce Commission first defined
"irregular route non-radial authority" in classification case
M 2, M.C.C. 703.

There the Commission defined that type of

authority as authority for a person,
"who or which undertakes to transport property or
any class or classes of property in interstate or
foreign commerce, by motor vehicle, for compensation, over irregular routes, between points in
communities located within such general territory
as shall have been defined geographically and
authorized in Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity or Permit and any other points or
communities located within the named general territory, without respect to a hub community or fixed
base point of operations."
More recently, the Interstate Commerce Commission
has delineated the distinction between radial and non-radial
authority in the case of T. I. McCormack Trucking Co., Inc.,
1966 F. car. cases #36,037.

In that case, the Commission

stated:
-5-
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"Radia~ au~hority is distinguished from non-radial
authority in that the latter allows operations
b7tw7en de~ignated points, or between all points
wi~hin a single described area (which often comprises a number of states) , where the former contains the phrase 'on the one hand, and on the othe ,
and is one which describes two areas between which r '
service may be rendered."

In the case of Uintah Freightways Certificate

~.

1288, none of the language describing the authority containea
therein is of the type used by the Public Service Commission
or the Interstate Commerce Commission to describe radial
authority.

The language contained therein is non-radial

authority.

Under such circumstances, the underlying reasons

stated in Miller, supra, for describing a single grant of
authority, no longer exists since there is no possibility of
a "pattern of radial authority" in this case.

The Interstate

Commerce Commission has held in several cases that where then
is non-radial authority of the type found here, the authoriti
may be tacked.

In the case of Frozen Food Express, Extension

Yeast, 91 M.C.C. 592, 594, the Commission stated:
"Separately stated grants which have nevertheless
been found to be single grants of authority which
cannot be tacked are ordinarily easily distinguishable as such since they merely constitute what is
in effect a single, radial 'between' authority .
stated in two parts; for example, from a base point
to points in an outlying territory and from.points
in the latter territory back to the base point.
The authority in the Schenecker and Boswell case
cited by protestants is of this kind, as was t~at
in G & M Motor Transfer Co., Inc., common carrier
application, 42 M.c.c. 497. Where the.separate~y
stated authorities have not been of this type, it
has been found that they may be tacked, even though
they have been granted in the same proceeding."
(Cf. 'AAA Trucking Corp. , Inc., v. Burgmyer Bros·' se ..
100 M.C.C. 470, and Houff Transfer, Inc. -- Purcha
Board Truck Lines, Inc., 101 M.C.C. 727.)
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In light of the fact that the authority contained in Uintah
Freightways Certificate ~o. 1288 is non-radial authority, and
in light of the above-quoted cases, we respectfully submit
that the descriptions are two separate grants of authority
granted in one proceeding and, therefore, they may be tacked.
II
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE PETITIONER
HAD MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THE PROPOSED
ALTERNATE ROUTE SERVICE SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED
Appellant-Respondent from the very outset of the
hearing in the instant matter has urged upon the Commission
and this Court that the Interstate Commerce Commission rules
and case law on the subject of alternate route deviation
have certain precedent value.

At the

hearin~,

Mr. Boyle,

Appellant-Protestant counsel, urged that the rule and cases
of the Interstate Commerce Commission to the effect that if
a deviation is more than 10%, the applicant must prove public
convenience and necessity, should be applied to the instant
petition.

(R-46.)

Moreover, in its brief before this Court,

The Appellant-Protestant further urges the criteria established
in the Michigan Express, Inc., Extension case, 108 M.C.C. 245,
upon the Court and the Commission.
It has long been the position of this Court that
the rules and cases of the Interstate Commerce Commission do
not bind the Public Service Commission.

Los Angeles & Salt

Lake Railway co. v. Public Service Comm., 15 P. 2d 538, 369.
This Court, in the case of Lewis Bros. Stages v. Public Service
~,

547 P. 2d 199, 201, stated:

-7-
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"The asserti~n t~at.the spl~tting of the regular
is illegal is predicated on the
decisions and regulations of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
It has not shown that the
Public Service Commission has established a similar policy."
rou~e.authority

It is respectfully submitted that, certainly, the rules and
case law of the Interstate Commerce Commission evidence cer·
tain guidelines by which policy may be initially set by the
Public Service Commission.

However, the Interstate Cornrnercil

Commission rules and regulations cease to be of precedent
value where, as in the case of alternate route deviation, ti;I'
Public Service Commission has laid down its own guidelines,
In the case of Palmer Brothers, Inc., Case No,
4869, Sub-No. 1, Report and Order, the Commission laid down

I

its own guidelines in the area of alternate route deviation.
In the case of Palmer Brothers, Inc. , the Commission found
that the petitioner had authority to serve in the transport;'[
tion of commodities between Salt Lake City and Provo, Utah,:
utilizing Highway 40 to Heber City and Utah Highway 189 tofJ
not serving any of the intermediate points between Salt Lak1
and Provo over said routes.

The Commission further found

that the applicant daily ·transported in interstate commerce
over the said Heber City route substantial quantities of
freight originating at or destined for Salt Lake City m
Provo, and as such, was presently in active competition for
traffic to and from such cities.

l
shorter ana I

The Commission found that

the proposed alternate route was some 35 miles

took approximately 2-1/4 hours less for a comp 1 e t e
Additionally, the Commission found that
and more dangerous for the applicant to

-8-

round tr::

it was uneconomical
operate over the

I
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Heber City gateway between Salt Lake City and Provo "by reason
of the additional mileage, the steeper grades involved, and
the condition of said route during the winter monthsi".

After

making such findings of fact, the Commission found it to be
in the public interests to make the amendment to the applicant's
Certificate.

It is respectfully submitted that in every parti-

cular the Palmer case is identical to the instant case.
In the instant case, the applicant has authority by
virtue of its tacking of parts A and B of its Certificate No.
1288 to provide service from Salt Lake City, Utah to Price,
via Duchesne, Utah.

The applicant daily transports intrastate

over said Duchesne route substantial quantities of freight
originating at or destined for Salt Lake City or Price.

(R-7.)

Additionally, the route deviation involved herein would save
approximately 140 miles and a fuel saving of approximately
8,424 gallons of fuel per year.

The route deviation would

also save in excess of 3-1/2 hours per day in the performance
of the service from Salt Lake City to Price and return.

(R-7,

8 and 9.)
In addition to the foregoing, it was noted at the
time of the hearing that the route which the petitioner presently travels takes it over Utah Highway 33, which goes through
Indian Canyon.

Indian Canyon involves a very steep grade and a

9,000-foot pass, and a highway which is not at all times cleared
of snow and ice by the Highway Department.
sometimes totally impassable.

(R-9, 10.)

It is dangerous and
In summary, an

analysis of the actual situation in the Palmer Brothers case
-9-
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and the instant case shows an almost identical state
facts.

0

f

th1
In light of the decision in Palmer Brothers and thi

Commission's findings in the instant case, the criteria of
Palmer and the criteria of the Public Service Commission

0

the State of Utah have been met and the Public Service
Commission properly granted the instant application.
III.

THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY APPLIED BOTH THE STATUTORY
AND CASE LAW IN GRANTING THE INSTANT APPLICATION.

Before the Commission, as noted above, the Appel

Protestant urged that the Commission adopt the rule of the

Interstate Commerce Commission which allowed route deviati

only if they are less than 10% of the mileage incurred und
the present operation.

Additionally, the Appellant

co~~

that in the event that the route deviation was greater tha

10% of the current mileage, then the applicant had to prov

public convenience and necessity.

We would respectfully draw the Court's attentioi
once again to the Palmer Brothers case, supra.

In that ca

the Public Service Commission laid down the guidelines for
granting of route deviation applications.

That case invol

a proposed deviation which was 45% of the old circuitous

1

substantially less than the 90% rule required by the Intel
commerce Commission rules.

The instant application involi

deviation which is only 30% less than the mileage travelec
under the old route.

As noted above, the Public Service (

mission may establish its own guidelines and need not be

1

by the rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce

-10-by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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commission.

Lewis Bros. Stages, Inc. v. Public Service

commission, supra.
The Appellant-Protestant next argues that if the
applicant failed to meet the guidelines set down in Palmer
Brothers case, it is required to prove public convenience
and necessity in the alternative.

It is respectfully sub-

mitted that this is contrary to the position taken by the
Legislature in the statutes.

In 54-4-25, Utah Code Annotated,

1953, it states:
"Certificate of Convenience and Necessity prerequisite
to construction and operation -- (1) No railroad corporation, street railroad corporation, aerial bucket
tramway corporation, gas corporation, electric corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, heat corporation, automobile corporation, water
corporation, or sewage corporation shall ftenceforth
establish or begin construction or operation of a
railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway, line,
route, plant or system, or any extension of such railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway line,
route, plant or system, without having first obtained
from the Commission a certificate that present or
future public convenience and necessity does or will
require such construction; provided that this section
shall not be construed to require any such corporation
to secure such certificate for an extension within any
city or town within which it shall have heretofore lawfully commenced operations or for an extension into
territory either within or without a city or town contiguous with its railroad, street railroad, aerial
bucket tramway, line, plant or system not theretofore
served by the public utility of like character or for
an extension within or to territory alread¥ served by
it necessary in the ordinary course of business; ••• ".
Section 54-2-1 (12), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defines the
term "automobile corporation" as follows:

"(12) The term 'automobile corporation' includes every
corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and
receivers, or trustees appointed by any court whatsoever, engaged in or transacting the business of transporting passengers or freight, merchandise, or ~ther
property for public service by means of autom~biles
or motor stages on public streets, roads or highways
onsored by thealong
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
provided
Institute of Museum and Library Servi
established
routes
within
thisby the
state."
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It is respectfully submitted that the establishment of a
"route" as noted in 54-4-25
ties.

(1)

requires no physical facili-

A reading of 54-6-5, Utah Code Annotated, indicates

only that a corranon carrier is required to have a Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity to operate in this state.

It is

respectfully submitted that the Uintah Freightways does
have a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity from the
Public Service Corranission and is operating as a common carrier
over the route described in its authority under Certificate
1288.

No.

It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the

Commission correctly found that 54-4-25 specifically covered
route deviations and, therefore, is controlling in this case.
Appellant-Protestant next argues that the Commission
misconceived the burden of proof in a route deviation case. 1!
Appellant-Protestant fails to take note that the Commission
found all of the facts necessary under the Palmer Brothers cas'
to make out a prima facie case for the route deviation .. hl
page 1 and 2 of its order, it found:

(1) the fact that the

applicant was currently hauling freight from Salt Lake Ci~,
Utah, to Provo, Utah and was therefore in active competition
for the freight to and from said cities;

( 2) the substantial

savings in miles operated and hours of operation on the new
route as opposed to the old, and the resultant economy in
the new route; and ( 3) the increase of safety of the new route
as opposed to the old.

It l.. s respectfully submitted that the

. ma faci· e case for route deviation.
applicant established a Prl.
The burden of proof thereafter shifted to the Protestant, Rio
Grande Motor Ways, to go forward

W ith

the evidence and shOW
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that the applicant was not in effective competition with it
or that there would be an adverse affect or decrease in
revenue as a result of destructive competition from the
route deviation.

It is respectfully submitted that the

Protestants failed to meet this burden of going forward with
the proof in that they failed to demonstrate that the applicant was not in effective competition with, nor did they
demonstrate that there had been any adverse or decreased
revenues, or any other evidence of destructive competition
by reason of the performance of the services of the Uintah
Freightways.
In attempting to demonstrate that the applicant
was not an effective competitor with them, the.Protestant,
Rio Grande, put on evidence as to the operating ratio of its
company and the minimal amount of revenue that that Protestant
had received from operations over that route.

It is respect-

fully submitted that this is certainly not evidence as to the
ability of Uintah Freightways to make a profit, since there
was no evidence of the costs of operations of Uintah Freightways.

Merely because the Protestant, Rio Grande, could not

operate at a profit does not indicate that the PetitionerRespondent could not operate at a profit.

As a matter of

fact, the testimony from Mr. Smith indicates that he is making
money on the instant ope~ation from Salt Lake using the present
route.

(T-24.)

Moreover, Mr. Smith's uncontested testimony

indicates that he is regularly competing with the instant
Protestants.

(T-24.)
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Additionally, the Protestants in this case have
failed to introduce any evidence to show that there has been
any adverse or decreased revenues, or any other evidence of
destructive competition by reason of the performance of the
service by Uintah Freightways.
In summary, therefore, it is respectfully submitted
that the Commission certainly had substantial evidence from
which to make its findings of fact, and, further, that it
correctly applied the law to the instant situation in this
case.
CONCLUSION
The Commission has found that the instant route
deviation would be in the public interest.

The Commission
T~

decision was based upon substantial evidence of record.

Commission found that, based upon the record and argument of
counsel,

( 1) Uintah Freightways had the authority to operate

from Salt Lake City to Price via Duchesne;

!

(2) That the peti-

tioner had operated between Salt Lake City and Price and had
been operating on a regular-route, daily basis, since May of
1976;

(3) that the grant of the instant deviation petition

would result in substantial economies; and (4) that the grut
of the instant petition would result in significant safety
improvement.

In short, there was substantial evidence support·

ing the finding of the Commission that the Petitioner-Respondent;
I

had met its burden of proof under the Palmer case, supra.
Appellant-Protestant has based its appeal upon cases
and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

The
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public service Commission has, however, in the case of route
deviations, developed different standards for proceedings
before it.

The

r.c.c.

cases and regulations cited by

Appellant are thereby inapposite and cannot serve as a basis
for altering the Commission's decision.
Because the Commission's decision is based upon
substantial evidence, it should be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully prays that the
court affirm the decision of the Public Service Corranission
and dismiss the appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

Bruce w. Shand
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent,
UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS
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